This paper compares the diversification patterns of agents who maximize a generalized expected utility (GEU), to the diversification patterns of agents who follow the CAPM. We consider two identical countries with equity returns having the same mean and variance in terms of their domestic currency, but not perfectly correlated. In these circumstances, even a small amount of undiversifiable exchange rate risk would lead to low or zero international diversification among countries if agents maximize GEU, whereas CAPM would imply considerable diversification. Consequently, first order risk aversion should be added to the explanatory factors that account for the observed diversification patterns.
One of the puzzles of international finance is the absence of a greater international diversification of portfolios. Past literature showed that the observed portfolio diversification is low in comparison to the one predicted by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), concluding that this is a puzzle. 1 Several interpretations were advanced for the low diversification. 2 None of these interpretations seems to provide a fully satisfactory explanation. 3 As is well known, the CAPM describes the demand for assets by agents whose attitude towards risk conforms Savage's framework. The purpose of this paper is to study the patterns of diversification and the assets market equilibrium for agents whose preferences differ from the preferences assumed by the CAPM model. Specifically, we derive the patterns of diversification for agents that are maximizing a generalized expected utility (GEU) in which the outcomes are weighted "rankdependently," as in Yaari (1987) and Segal (1989) . 4 In the rank-dependent utility framework, agents attach more weight to the utility in "bad" outcomes than to the one in "good" outcomes in comparison to the probability weights used in a conventional expected utility maximization. A consequence of this weighting pattern is that the agent exhibits downside risk aversion, implying a first order risk premium (proportional to the standard deviation), unlike the case in Savage's framework, where the risk premium is of a second order (proportional to the variance). 5 1 French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1992) pointed out that about 94% of the US investor's wealth is held in domestic equity, much more than the optimal share predicted by the conventional CAPM model. 2 See Lewise (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for comprehensive overviews of the puzzle and the existing interpretations. Among the possible factors accounting for the patterns of diversification are non traded goods [see Eldor, Pines and Schwartz (1988) , Stockman and Dellas (1989) , Lewis (1995) and Baxter, and Jermann and King (1994) ], markets segmentation [Tesar and Werner (1992) , Claessens and Rhee (1993) and Lewis (1995) ], and market frictions and transaction costs [see Cole and Obstfeld (1991) ].
-3 -We show that agents who maximize a rank dependent expected utility tend to refrain from diversification in comparison to the diversification observed with Savage's type of agents.
We focus on the symmetric case --two identical countries with equity returns having the same mean and variance in terms of their domestic currency, but not perfectly correlated. In these circumstances, even a small amount of undiversifiable exchange rate risk would lead to low or zero international diversification among countries if agents maximize the GEU, whereas CAPM would imply considerable diversification.
Section 1 provides an overview of expected utility with a rank-dependent probability weights framework. Section 2 considers a simple example of a 3 assets economy [one safe and two risky equities], explaining the patterns of diversification for an agent maximizing a rank dependent utility. Section 3 concludes with interpretive remarks.
1.
Expected utility with rank-dependent probability weights -an overview
The impetus for the development of the generalized expected utility approaches arises from the various anomalies that are at odds with the predictions of Savage's framework. 6 A simplified version of the model can be presented as a one-parameter extension of the standard neoclassical expected utility model. We review in this section the rank-dependent framework by considering the simplest case ---a two-states-of-nature example.
The preferences of a rank dependent maximizer can be summarized by [u(x) ,γ ], where u is a conventional utility function describing the utility of consuming x , [u ] , and ' > 0, u"< 0 1 ≥ γ ≥ 0 is a parameter that measures the weighting of a high-ranked outcome relative to a lowranked one. This weighting is obtained by replacing the probability weight p i attached to utility
) in the EU framework, with a modified weight, defined by a proper transformation of p γ .
Suppose that with probability α the agent receives income x 1 , and with probability (1-α) income x 2 , where x 1 > x 2 . The rank dependent expected utility V(γ ) is defined by:
Alternatively,
For γ = 1, V is identical to the conventional expected utility. In this case, good and bad states of nature are treated symmetrically in weighting the utility measure u , each weighted by its probability. A lower value for γ implies that the agent attaches an extra weight of (1
the "bad" state, and attaches a lesser weight of (1 − α )ω to the "good" state. As we show below, weighting states of nature asymmetrically induces a first order risk premium, whereas symmetric 6 Examples of systematic, seemingly paradoxical responses of agents include Allais (1953) , Ellsberg (1961) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991) . The rank-dependent expected utility for the case of n states of nature, ordered so that
concave, hence high-ranked outcomes are weighted less.
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This follows from the fact that (1') implies that
pronounced rank weighting, leading to a risk premium proportional to the standard deviation, where the proportionality factor depends positively on the concavity of the weighting scheme.
Henceforth we refer to ω as the coefficient of first order risk aversion. 9 Figure 1 indicates that the ratio of the marginal utility of a loss to the marginal utility of a gain is [1+ ω] / [1 − ω ]. The literature refers to this ratio as the loss aversion, measuring the tendency of agents to be more sensitive to reductions in their utility than to increases. This ratio is 1 in the conventional Savage framework, and exceeds 1 for agents exhibiting first order risk aversion. Empirical estimates of loss aversion are typically in the neighborhood of 2, indicating that γ ≅ 0.74 if the agents' preferences conform to the rank dependent framework [see Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) ].
To gain further insight regarding ω , consider the problem of allocating wealth between a safe asset, offering an expected yield of r 0 , and a risky asset offering a random yield of r . There are 2 states of nature, each with probability half. The yield r may be high (= r 0 + e + ε ) or low (= r 0 + e − ε ); where e denotes the expected excess yield of the risky asset. The initial wealth is normalized to 1, and x is the wealth share invested in the risky asset. Applying (1'), the expected utility is
= e − εω . Hence, the risky asset would be demanded only if e > εω --if the expected excess yield exceeds the product of the coefficient of first order risk aversion ω times the standard deviation ε (= the risk premium identified above). Recalling that ω is zero if the agent maximizes the conventional expected utility, we infer that a Savage type maximizer will demand the risky asset as long as its expected excess yield is positive. Hence, first order risk aversion tends to curtail the demand for risky assets. We turn now to extend this discussion to the case of several risky assets, characterizing the conditions leading to diversification.
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Note that for γ close to 1, ω ≅ (1 − γ )ln 2 .
Asset diversification with rank-dependent expected utility
We explore the implications of a rank-dependent expected utility framework on asset diversification. We focus on a simple example of allocating initial wealth among 3 assets -a risk free asset, and domestic and foreign risky equities. We assume that the financial spreads are large enough to ignore borrowing. The safe asset offers a real yield of r 0 . The domestic and foreign equities offer random yields of r; r *, respectively. The yield for each equity may be high or low. We denote the corresponding states of nature by h and l for the home equity, and by The probabilities of the various states are probability of state
The correlation between the returns of the domestic and the foreign equities is ρ = 4 p − 1. The expected excess yields of the domestic and the foreign equities relative to the yield of the safe asset are given by e , respectively. , e * The agent allocates a fraction x and x* of his initial wealth between the domestic and foreign equity. Applying section 1 we infer that the expected utility is
where
u .
To gain further insight we first study a simulation, and close the section with an analytic solution of the optimal portfolio using a second order Taylor approximation. We consider two identical countries with equity returns having the same mean and variance in terms of their domestic currency, but not perfectly correlated, where some of the exposure to exchange rate risk is undiversifiable. Specifically, we assume that the risk free real interest rate is zero, and the expected excess returns for the home and the foreign equity are 6% in both markets. The standard deviations of equity returns, evaluated in terms of their corresponding domestic currency, are the same. Some of the exchange rate risk is undiversifiable. Hence, the excess volatility of the foreign equity above the domestic volatility reflects this undiversifiable exchange rate risk. For the purpose of the simulation we assume that the standard deviation of returns facing the domestic agent are 0.20 for domestic equity, and 0.24 for foreign equity.
Thus, the undiversifiable exchange rate risk adds in this example 20% extra risk to the foreign equity. 10 The correlation of returns is 0.5; 11 and the utility u is a CRRA, with the relative risk 10 These assumptions are motivated by the experience of the flexible exchange rate regime, where high volatility of the nominal exchange rate coincides with a negligible correlation between exchange rate changes and the equity yields evaluated in terms of the corresponding domestic currency. While traders may reduce their exposure to exchange rate risk by forward contracts, as long as these contracts are costly and unavailable for some maturities, one expects some exchange rate risk to be undiversifiable. If agents are maximizing the conventional expected utility, we would observe considerable diversification --agents would invest about 60% of their wealth in the domestic equity, and about 30% in the foreign equity. Agents would demand only the domestic equity for γ = 0.72 [with x = 0.24]. Consequently, agents demanding a first order risk premium tend to refrain from holding assets the normalized excess return of which is relatively low, as is the case in the present example with the foreign equity (where the "normalized excess return" of an equity is its excess return/yield's standard deviation ratio). A relatively small undiversifiable foreign exchange rate risk suffices to shrink substantially (and even eliminate) the diversification of a GEU agent.
We turn now to the analytical solution of the optimal portfolio. We use a second order Taylor approximation of the expected utility (3) around x = x* = 0, inferring that
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The correlation between the U.S. stock market and the EAFE index was 0.48 for the period of 1970-1996 [see Lewis (1998) ].
where ω = (0.5)
= ee * +εε *ω − eε *˜ ω − e * εω ; Ω 2 = ee * +εε *ω − e * ε˜ ω − eε *ω; The approximated value of the optimal portfolio shares is obtained by solving the first order conditions
, and
Note that in financial autarky, x* = 0. Applying (4), the demand for the domestic equity in these circumstances is
If the agent is maximizing the conventional expected utility, γ = 1. In these circumstances (5) and (5') are simplified to
The terms e ε ; e * ε * measure the excess premium normalized by the standard deviation of the equity yield --the normalized excess return. Condition (6) indicates that, for γ = 1, both equities will be demanded if the normalized excess return of each equity exceeds the product of the correlation times the normalized excess return of the other equality. This condition is met trivially if the correlation is zero (or negative). For a positive correlation, diversification will be
Hence, an agent maximizing a conventional expected utility tends to diversify as long as the correlation among yields is not too close to 1. This result, however, does not hold for an agent that demands a first order risk premium. To verify this point, Figure 3 plots the demand for the two assets as depicted by (5) and (5') as a function of γ. This is done for the same example used in Figure 2 --the correlation of returns is 0.5, the expected excess return for both equities is 6%, and the standard deviation of the domestic and the foreign returns (from the point of view of domestic agent) is 0.2 and 0.24, respectively. The utility u is a CRRA, with the relative risk aversion R = 2. The solid curve (xx) depicts the share of the domestic equity x, and the bold curve (x*x*) plots the share of the foreign equity, both calculated applying (5) and (5'), assuming diversification. The dotted curve (x'x') depicts the share of the domestic equity in financial autarky, where the demand for the foreign assets is zero [obtained from (5")].
Condition (7) is met for this example, thus both equities are demanded if the agent maximizes the conventional expected utility ( γ = 1). A higher degree of first order risk aversion [i.e., a lower γ] reduces the demand for both assets. For high enough first order risk aversion, the demand for foreign assets drops to zero (see point B'). A further drop in γ reduces the demand for the domestic asset along curve x'x'. 12 Hence, the actual demand for the domestic equity is given by curve ABC. Figure 3 indicates that a first order risk aversion curtails the demand for both equities. If the normalized excess return of the domestic equity exceeds that of the foreign one, high enough first order risk aversion will eliminate the demand for the foreign equity, while the demand for the domestic one is positive. Recall our assumption that the borrowing-lending spread is large enough to preclude borrowing.
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Recall that the correlation between the U.S. stock market and the EAFE index was 0.48 for the period of 1970-1996 [see Lewis (1998) ]. Solnik (1996) reports a modest, but significant increase in this correlation in the last 30 years. This is consistent with the presumption that deeper global integration tends to increase that correlation. Hence, the two panels in Figure 4 cover the end points of the relevant range for the correlation between the equity market in the U.S. and a well diversified global equity index. the returns of domestic and foreign equity increases to 0.75. Note that the higher correlation shifts ZZ to the left, shrinking the range of diversification. Consequently, the threshold excess volatility (ε*/ε-1) leading to zero diversification for a given γ drops. 14 3.
Discussion and concluding remarks
The above analysis illustrates that the conventional Savage framework predicts deep diversification in comparison to the diversification undertaken by agents who demand a first order risk premium. We close the discussion with several interpretive remarks.
Our analysis focused on a symmetric environment, where the expected return and the volatility of the home equity are the same for the domestic agent in each economy. In this environment, if some of the exchange rate risk is undiversifiable, then the foreign equity in each country is more volatile than the corresponding domestic equity. This will lead to a symmetric home bias in both countries. While our analysis focused on one country (called the 'Home country'), a symmetric equilibrium applies to the second country, relabeling the identity of Home and the Foreign equities. Our model ignored issues related to the equilibrium allocation of the riskless asset. It can be extended to address these issues. For example, in a symmetric environment a small extra trading cost of the foreign riskless asset, above the trading cost of the domestic riskless asset, suffices to induce an equilibrium where each country would supply its own riskless asset. This would lead to a home bias also in the riskless asset.
14 The present paper narrows the scope of the analysis to the simplest model allowing us to identify the implications of the GEU on the home bias. In order to address further general equilibrium implications of undiversifiable exchange rate risk in a GEU framework, one should extend the model to (at least) 2 periods. A minimal way to do it is to extend the GEU specified in Section 1, labeled V , to a 2 period utility, where there is uncertainty in period 1 regarding the consumption in period 2. In this case, the agent determines the portfolio by maximizing
, where u is the conventional utility, and V is the GEU described in section 1 (see Epstein and Zin (1990) for a related discussion, though in a different context).
-14 --A key factor determining the diversification pattern in a symmetric universe is the excess volatility of the foreign equity due to undiversifiable foreign currency risk. This suggests that the proliferation of international index funds that allow deeper global diversification will tend to reduce the volatility of the international equity, and will encourage portfolio diversification. One should keep in mind, however, that this is only one of the forces at work. If globalization will increase the correlation among markets, it will diminish the scope for diversification. Hence, if the future entails both effects (proliferation of index funds and higher correlation among markets), the predicted change in the patterns of diversification will be ambiguous. In closing the paper, it is instructive to note that one should not expect the diversification puzzle to be accounted for by a unique factor. Hence, this paper does not claim that adopting a generalized expected utility perspective will suffice to explain the puzzle. Instead, this paper argues that first order risk aversion should be added to the explanatory factors that may ultimately account for the observed diversification patterns.
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In concluding their paper Harless and Camerer (1994) pointed out that "The pairwisechoice studies suggest that violations of expected utility are robust enough that modeling of aggregate economic behavior based on alternatives to expected utility is well worth exploring" (page 1286). 
First and second order risk aversion
Drawn for the case where consumption fluctuates between (1-ε) and (1+ε), the probability of each state is 0.5, and ε = 0.05. Curve MU is the marginal utility of consumption for γ = 1. Curve AB'BEE'D is the modified marginal utility of consumption for 0 < γ < 1. 
